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KNOWLEDGE WORK: NEW METAPHORS FOR THE NEW
ECONOMY
CATHERINE L. FISK*

INTRODUCTION

Metaphors and stories are the currency of complex systems. Like currency, they simplify transactions and help us understand that which is too
new or too complex to grasp. Metaphors and narratives are crucial in labor
and employment law, for the law of the workplace is an extraordinarily
complex system and is becoming more so. Indeed, to use a metaphor, one
might say that the law of the workplace is in the midst of a perfect storm.
The winds of change are blowing hard from many directions. Globalization
and information technology are changing every aspect of the way we work.
Stable corporate jobs are disappearing, as AT&T (before it was swallowed
in a merger) and Kodak were both dropped from the Dow Jones Industrial
Average because they are too small. ' Unions are either withering or reinventing themselves as community organizations or professional associations. The convergence of these dramatic changes creates the need to
address the demands of firms, workers, and society for a fundamental rethinking of labor and employment law and policy. We need new metaphors
and narratives about work if we are to understand and effectively respond
to these changes.
The focus of this paper is a segment of the new economy that is
vaguely, and usually breathlessly, referred to as "knowledge work." Concepts like "knowledge work," "the new economy," and "the information
age" moved rapidly from novelty to clich6, without gaining either a terribly
clear meaning or a solid foothold in American law. The terms conjure up
* Professor of Law, Duke University. I am grateful to Professor Martin Malin for inviting me to
deliver the lecture, to Greg W. Castle and Julia A. Clark for their commentary, to the Piper Foundation
for its support of the lecture, and to Paytre Topp (USC Law School Class of 2005) for outstanding
research assistance.
1. According to the Wall Street Journal, the Dow added the insurance company American International Group, Inc., the pharmaceutical company Pfizer, and Verizon Communications to replace
AT&T, Eastman Kodak, and International Paper Co. The last time the Dow changed its composition
was in 1999, when Home Depot, Intel, Microsoft, and SBC Communications replaced Chevron, Goodyear, Scars Roebuck, and Union Carbide. E.S. Browning, Dow Jones Reshuffles Index, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 2, 2004, at C1.
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images of computers, independent contractors, intellectual property, and
globalization. In addition, depending on one's politics, the narratives invoked by the concepts typically take one of two turns. The upbeat narrative
might involve someone like my neighbor Rachel, a screenwriter and TV
director who does much of her fascinating work in her beautiful home
where she has flexible hours and thus always seems to be available for her
children. The grim narrative features what Ross Perot called a giant sucking sound as all decent jobs in Silicon Valley are "offshored" to India.
I might have begun with a different metaphor, one used by James
Meadows, the Vice President of Human Resources at AT&T, when the
company cut 40,000 jobs in 1996. He was quoted as saying,
People need to look at themselves as self-employed, as vendors who
come to this company to sell their skills ...In AT&T, we have to promote the whole concept of the work force being contingent, though most
of our contingent. workers are inside our walls.. "Jobs" are being replaced by "projects" and "fields of work,"...2 giving rise to a society
that is increasingly "jobless but not workless."
Another AT&T spokesperson was blunter in her choice of metaphor to
describe the layoffs; she said it was as if the company had asked everybody
"to step out into a parking lot." A review of resumes would then decide
which people had the skills and knowledge that made them worth inviting
3
back into the building.
These metaphors were used instrumentally. They are neither politically neutral nor dictated by economic reality or social consensus. This is
apparent when AT&T, the firm that was once synonymous with the corporate career, the company that combined continual technological innovation
with stable employment, suddenly described its employees as vendors of
skills hired from the parking lot like longshoremen off the docks or day
laborers at Home Depot. When employees are vendors of skills, they are no
longer "employees" to whom the company owes expensive health and pension benefits. There are no more long-term employment contracts limiting
company flexibility and dragging down share prices on Wall Street. A
well-chosen metaphor magically shifts all risk of economic downturn from
AT&T (and its directors, officers, and shareholders) to its former employ2. Edmund L. Andrews, Don't Go Away Mad, Just Go Away; Can AT&T Be the Nice Guy As It
Cuts 40,000 Jobs?, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1996, at D1, D6. AT&T refused to describe the massive job
cuts as layoffs or firings, preferring instead to call it a "force management program" aimed at reducing
"an imbalance of forces or skills." The parking lot metaphor invokes the dreaded "shape up" that,
before the days of the Longshoremen's Union, was the way stevedoring companies hired. They had a
bunch of prospective workers line up on the dock and foremen would pick the ones who looked most

promising. The Longshoremen's union fought hard to replace the humiliations and vagaries of the shape
up with a union-controlled hiring hall.

3. Id.
atDI.
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ees. Meadows was quite entrepreneurial in his choice of metaphor. Ironithe parking
cally, he himself wound up not being "invited back in from
4
deal.
retirement
early
generous
a
received
he
lot"-though
Throughout American history, lawyers, judges, and firms long have
been entrepreneurs in using narrative and metaphor. They strategically
deploy stories, metaphors, and images to shape the legal culture of work.5
Their narratives did not and do not simply recount happenings; they give
them shape, give them a point, and proclaim their results. 6 Of course, neither management nor any one particular ideological position has a monopoly on the entrepreneurial use of metaphor and narrative. Critics of the
phenomenon of outsourcing technology jobs to India have been equally
entrepreneurial as AT&T's spokespersons when they attempt to frame the
debate in terms of a loss of "American" jobs. We lawyers and scholars
need to think carefully about the metaphors and narratives that will frame
the debate about labor policy in the new economy, for the choices we make
may have significant consequences for the welfare of workers, firms, and
society.
To begin that task, I will explore the importance of metaphors and narratives that shape American labor and employment law. Second, I will
identify some of the major and salient changes in employment that are usually referred to as the rise of knowledge work and the new economy, and I
will examine how those changes have been implemented through the telling of new narratives. Finally, given that the choice of metaphors and narratives is political, I will offer some ideas for better metaphors and
narratives in labor and employment law as a way of getting us to attend to
the social and distributional consequences of the choices we make.
I.

THE METAPHORS AND NARRATIVES OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

LAW

If metaphors are the currency of complex systems, and, like currency,
exist to simplify what would otherwise be extraordinarily complicated
communication and transactions, then the importance of metaphor in the
4. Id. at D6.
5. The term "narrative entrepreneurs" was coined by John Fabian Witt in Narrating Bankruptcy/NarratingRisk, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 303, 306 (2003). Witt adapted the term from Cass R. Sunstein's term "norm entrepreneurs," Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909
(1996), and credits PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 3-71 (Richard Nice trans.,
1977) and DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KFYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE

INDEPENDENCE 8-11 (1987).
6. 1 borrowed this insight from Yale literature professor Peter Brooks who used it in a paper on
narrative in the law that he delivered at USC Law School in March 2003.
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law of work should be plain to everyone reading this. Anyone familiar with
labor and employment law, and with the corporate and social welfare laws
that are so intimately related to the law of work, knows the complexity of
the field and the need for simplification. Historically, and today, metaphors
and narratives are one of the ways in which lawyers and judges translate
complex social relations into the web of legal rights that shape the relation
between workers and the corporations that employ them. Thus, metaphors
about the nature and structure of corporations have been extraordinarily
important in determining the legal rights of the stakeholders in the modem
firm, including managers, shareholders, bondholders, employees, contractors, customers, and suppliers.
A.

Metaphors and Narrativesof the Corporation

One of the most influential metaphors in shaping the modem law of
work is not one about workers but one about corporations. Since the latenineteenth century, law has treated the corporation as a person. The metaphor has enabled all sorts of important legal moves. It underlies the claim
of the corporation to be an author entitled to as much protection for the
works of its employees as Ernest Hemingway and Emily Dickinson were
entitled to for theirs. 7 It underlies the claim of corporations to be persons
8
entitled to free speech rights under the First Amendment.
Most significantly, the metaphor of a corporation as a person facilitated the development of a managerial class that directs the work of employees for the benefit of investors. 9 The legal and social power of
managers was created in part by the metaphor that managers and officers
are the "head" of the corporate person. Consider a mid-twentieth century
corporate organization chart. The CEO was at the top of the pyramid, the
head of the corporate person, like the king was the head of the fictive body
politic. The corporate organization chart, with its simplified portrayal of the
company as a pyramid, was every bit the political statement as was a map
7. See Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE
..L. & HUMAN. 1 (2003).
8. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). On corporations and the first
amendment, see generally Victor Brudney, Business Corporationsand Stockholders' Rights Under the
First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981); William Patton & Randall Bartlett, Corporate "'Persons"
and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 494; Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 133 (1998).
9. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); OLIVIER ZUNZ, MAKING AMERICA CORPORATE, 18701920 (1990); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital. What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003).
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that placed the United States at the center, relegating Central Asia and the
North and South Pole to the illegible fringes, or a map that marked areas
not settled by white Europeans as uninhabited wastelands, or the famous
Saul Steinberg New Yorker magazine cover on which the Hudson River
marked the end of civilization. Corporate organization charts reduced employees to anonymous spots at the far bottom margin. Independent contractors, customers, and suppliers were off the map entirely.
The metaphors of the corporate person and the company organization
chart naturalized the standard theory that corporate managers speak only
for the shareholders. The investment made by shareholders (not employees)
was the investment that the managers owed a fiduciary duty to protect, and
the law obligated managers loyally and competently to consider only the
interests of the shareholders. This standard account of corporate law is
itself a simplified story, for today, of course, the "shareholders" really
means the investment advisors and analysts whose assessments actually
determine the price of stocks on Wall Street. The history of modem American corporate law could be told as a long story to ensure that only those
who invest capital (as opposed to labor or raw materials) count as important stakeholders, or as persons to whom the officers owe a fiduciary
duty. 10
One success of the modem corporation was its ability to attract the
talent of workers, who otherwise might have been independent entrepreneurs, without offering them ownership, control, or even the obligation of
managers to protect their interests. 11 The metaphor that persuaded them
was that the company is a team, a community, or an institution like a university. The problem was that the company as a team metaphor conflicted
with the company as the agent of the shareholders metaphor on the issue of
who should bear the risk of loss.
The conflict became apparent when the Supreme Court decided in
1979 that employee pensions are not securities and, thus, that employees
may not sue for fraud when the company misrepresents the value of the
pension.12 Notwithstanding an entirely plausible argument based on statutory language as to why an employee's pension met the statutory test for a
"security" within the meaning of the Securities Act, the Court rejected that

10. Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive CorporateLaw, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1861 (2003).
11. Blair, supra note 9, at 396; Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of
the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds.,
1999).
12. See Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule
lOb-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 543 (2003).
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characterization of a pension. As the Court saw it, "[1]ooking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment. ' 13 After the collapse
of "new economy" companies like Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCorn, in which employees had been induced to accept substantial (but, as it
turned out, worthless) compensation in the form of stock options but lacked
the basic protections against fraud that the law extends to outside investors,
one sees the deleterious consequences of choosing the metaphor that does
not regard employees as investors in the firm.
The primacy of shareholders over employees has had other significant
consequences. Wall Street does not like companies whose labor costs it
considers excessive. When fiduciary duty principles lead officers to protect
only shareholders, and when executive compensation contracts reward
success only as measured by short-term improvements in share price, all
the legal incentives, whether imposed by contract or by securities law, encourage the outsourcing of work and the sweating of labor.
Consider three other examples of how corporate metaphor and narrative have shaped labor and employment law. First, the vision of the corporation as being distinct from and owing no labor or employment obligations
to workers who are not "employees" of the corporation has become deeply
problematic in today's world of contingent employment. In labor and employment law, it is a troubling fiction to say that only the corporation
whose name appears on the employee's paycheck is an "employer" for
purposes of all the statutes that define the scope of legal duty by reference
to who is an employer or employee. Consider a computer programmer on
the payroll of a temporary help contractor. Her employer for purposes of
law is the temp firm, regardless of who directs her work, who owns or
leases the office buildings where she works, or who is in a position effectively to fire her if some aspect of her work proves unsatisfactory. As the
Dunlop Commission reported, 14 employers use the independent contractor
designation to avoid the protections of federal and state labor legislation,
including the Fair Labor Standards Act,1 5 the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), 16 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 In addition, the independent contractor label enables employers to maintain tax-subsidized social
13. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
14. DUNLOP COMM'NON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT (1994).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2000) (defining "employee" for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards
Act).

16. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (defining "employee" for purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act).
17.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) (defining "employee" for purposes of Title VII).
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insurance programs-health, disability, and retirement benefits-for a
shrinking privileged core of workers while excluding others who are
equally long-term and economically dependent on their de facto employer. 18 It is our acceptance of the legally fictive entity-the corporation-as defining the scope of legal and social duties to the workers who
serve it that enables corporations that use and benefit from labor to avoid
most legal consequences for exploiting it.
A second example of the power of the narrative that separates employees from entrepreneurs in a corporation is suggested by a National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") case in which an employee proposed to
change an employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP") to increase the employees' ownership stake in the company from one percent to fifty percent. 19 The employee proposed that the ESOP do a clever leveraged buy
out, and he distributed leaflets arguing that the employees would enjoy
increased job stability, pay, and retirement benefits, and enhanced morale
through "participatory management." 20 His supervisors threatened to discipline him for distributing the leaflets. The NLRB found for the employer
on the ground that the distribution of the leaflets was not activity "for mutual aid or protection" within the protections of section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.2 1 The Board found the employee's conduct to be unprotected because "it was designed to change [the employer-employee]
relationship." 22 It explained:
[T]he thrust of the proposal was to cast employees in the role of owners
with ultimate corporate control, and thus fundamentally to change how
and by whom the corporation would be managed. The current employees
would not enjoy any of the envisioned benefits unless 23and until they,
through the ESOP, effectively controlled the corporation.

The Board stated that the NLRA protects employees' activity not when the
activity "relates to employees' interests generally," but only when it relates
to "the interests of employees qua employees. '24 Here, the conduct did not

18. Notwithstanding anomalous cases like Vizcaino v- Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc), which mounted a limited and highly fact-specific challenge to Microsoft's wide use of
independent contractor labels for employees, the independent contractor label allows employers to opt
out of core labor market regulation. See generally Symposium on the Regulatory Future of Contingent

Employment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725 (1995).
19. Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 N.L.R.B. 182 (1992).
20- Id21. Id.;
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
22. Harrah 's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 N.L.R.B. at 182-

23. Id.
24. Id.
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because the proposal advances "employees' interests [not] as employees
'25
[but as] entrepreneurs, owners, and managers.
Most of the writing on Silicon Valley suggests the silliness of the notion that workers are not "employees" when they advocate employee ownership of the firm. One need not even look to Silicon Valley to see why.
The gate agents, ticket agents, pilots, mechanics, and flight attendants of
United did not cease needing a union when their pension fund bought half
the airline, transforming them all into "employee-owners." All those programmers and systems designers who were paid in stock options during the
1990s did not cease being employees simply because they were taking a
part of their compensation in stock options. When Wal-Mart seeks to convince their minimum wage "Sales Associates" that the success of Wal-Mart
depends on their putting in extra effort, the clerks and greeters do not cease
to be employees in dire need of a union. In short, if the new economy
means anything, it means that the line between capital and labor, or between entrepreneurs and workers, is not the line between shareholders and
employees/independent contractors. The metaphorical bright lines that
were drawn around different parts of the° 'twentieth-century corporation
have shaped our thinking far too long.
My third example of inadequacy of the old narratives about the
boundaries of the corporation focuses on ownership of intellectual property, or control of "proprietary information" even if we do not call it intellectual property. In the dominant twentieth-century narrative about
corporate research and development ("R&D"), R&D occurred within the
boundaries of a single company. The dominant legal metaphor, therefore,
was that the corporation was the author or inventor. In both law and in
popular perception, the DuPont company was the inventor of nylon. 26 The
Disney Company was the author of Mickey Mouse. The legal rules followed from the metaphor of corporate invention. If a corporation employs
someone to innovate, the corporation owns the resulting patent, copyright,
or trade secret. If a corporation hires an employee of another company for
the purpose of acquiring that employee's knowledge about the innovation,
the corporation may violate the law. But if the corporation wants to acquire
an employee's knowledge, it can get it simply by merging with the corporation that employs the innovative employee. This merger ensures that the
financial benefit of an innovative employee's knowledge is passed on to the
shareholders rather than being reaped solely by the innovative employee.

25. Id.
26. See, e.g., GERARD COLBY ZILG, Du PONT: BEHIND THE NYLON CURTAIN (1974).
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The metaphor about corporate invention, the narrative of company
R&D on which it rests, and the legal doctrines that are built on both are
rapidly becoming anachronistic. A very large amount of innovation in today's economy is neither originated nor fully developed by a single corporation. Most scholars of innovation believe that much complex
technological innovation, and certainly some of the most dynamic of innovation, occurs by a "synthetic" process involving groups of employees at
different firms, not just the employees in a single firm.27 It is the interrelation among employees of manufacturers, suppliers, users, and even competitors that drives innovation. Thus, scholars tend to contrast what they
call the old "industrial" or "mass production" system with the new "network" or "synthetic" system. 28 The old narrative of innovation envisions
the innovation process as a linear process from an idea to a product. The
process occurs primarily within a single firm involving employees supervised in an efficient hierarchy in which individual managers play a determinative role. In the new synthetic reality, the process involves a network
of groups of workers at different firms, government agencies, or universities sharing ideas, learning continuously from each other about what does
and does not work, and solving problems as a group with little direction or
control from supervisors. Profitability comes less from efficiency, as was
the case in the mass production system, than from speed to market with
changing and complex products or processes that meet previously impossi29
ble performance characteristics.
Innovation no longer comes primarily from within a firm. For example, Eric von Hippel's empirical research has demonstrated that in the area
of scientific instruments, users developed 77% of the innovations studied. 30
Even in industries, such as the manufacture of fiberglass-type products,
where the users were not technologically sophisticated and in many cases
had no employees with academic training in materials science, users innovated. In a detailed case study of the manufacturers of pultrusion processes
for making fiber-reinforced products like fiberglass, innovations were developed mainly by users who were job shops and not high-tech firms, had

27. ROBERT W. RYCROFT & DON E. KASH, THE COMPLEXITY CHALLENGE: TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 16-20 (1999); see also LOUIS GALAMBOS & JANE ELIOT
SEWELL, NETWORKS OF INNOVATION: VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AT MERCK, SHARP & DOHME, AND

MULFORD, 1895-1995 (1995); ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 12-13 (1988).
28. Id.
29. RYCROFT& KASH, supranote 27, at 16-20.
30. VON HIPPEL, supra note 27, at 12-13.
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no organized R&D, and had no employees with formal training in plastics
or plastics fabrication. 3 1
Consider an example reported recently in The New Yorker magazine:
Merck, which historically has been a very innovative pharmaceutical company, devotes three billion dollars a year and ten thousand people to research and development of new drugs.32 Yet in the past four years,
33
according to The New Yorker, Merck has introduced just three new drugs.
Rather, what it and other major pharmaceutical companies do is acquire
smaller biotech firms that do invent new drugs. 34 So, notwithstanding its

huge R&D staff, Merck is actually a marketing and distribution firm, not an
organization that succeeds in scientific innovation. 35 The phenomenon is
not limited to pharmaceuticals. As Alan Hyde explained in his book on
Silicon Valley, many companies acquire new technology and new ideas by
36
merging with innovative companies rather than innovating internally.
In sum, the metaphor of the corporation as a person, and the related
conceptualization of it as an entity separate from all that surrounds it, have
shaped the law of employment and the legal economic conceptualization of
intellectual property and innovation. The narratives are no longer entirely
accurate stories about reality and the metaphors built on them are not helpful tools. It is time, in short, to incorporate into law new metaphors about
the nature of the corporation.
B.

Metaphors and Narrativesof the Employment Relation

Metaphors, narratives, and even the evocative phrase have played a
crucial role in shaping perceptions of the nature of employment and the
legal entitlements that flow from it. There are dozens of examples one
might give. Here I will offer four: (1) the important images of workers
created by their labels; (2) the ladder metaphor and the implied just cause
employment contract; (3) the ladder metaphor, the role of unions, and the
protections of the NLRA for professional and white collar workers; and (4)
the use of ladder and tournament metaphors to describe the internal labor
market and its implications for proof of employment discrimination.

31. Id. at 29-30.
32. James Surowiecki, The Pipeline Problem, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16 & 23, 2004, at 72.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. ld. It may be, however, that the last four years simply represent a slow period in the "long
cycle" of innovation in pharmaceuticals. See GALAMBOS & SEWELL, supra note 27, at 241.
36. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-

VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).
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The labels given to employees have always been powerful in evoking
their roles. Employee titles are actually highly condensed narratives that
convey powerful images about the nature of employment. In the nineteenth
century, employment law was the law of "master and servant." A "secretary" was a male employee with status and responsibility. A "clerk" was a
position that a college graduate would aspire to. The "superintendent" of a
railroad was among the top-ranking employees of the era's largest enterprises. By the late-twentieth century, secretaries were low-status female
employees. Clerks were minimum-wage workers with a high school diploma at best, and a "superintendent" was a blue-collar low-level manager
of a factory. Now "secretaries" have become "administrative assistants,"
clerks at Wal-Mart have become "associates," the same title enjoyed by
highly trained and highly compensated lawyers, and "superintendents"
have become regional managers or vice presidents in charge of production.
One reason for title inflation is the pursuit of the appearance of status,
without the reality of power, in the hierarchical employment structure. Another reason for title inflation is that it makes it easier for employers to
claim that the employees are exempt from the protections of labor laws
because they are not "employees," but are instead managers or supervisors. 37 One of the most pervasive of the old metaphors about the nature of
employment relationships is that there is a hierarchy in the workplace, a
ladder that an employee seeks to climb. The entire apparatus of the old
implied contractual protections requiring just cause discharge was based on
the characterization of the internal labor market as a "ladder." The legal
content of the employment contract was derived by judges from the premise that employees worked their way up in an organization, from dishwasher in a candy factory to executive vice president in charge of
production. 38 The implied contractual promise of just cause for discharge,
or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, prevented opportunistic
breaches of the implied contract of lifetime employment. ERISA's protections of vested pension benefits similarly were designed to protect against
an opportunistic breach of an implied promise of retirement security.
There are other legal doctrines built on the old ladder metaphor. One
of them involves the NLRA's definition of who is an "employee" entitled

37. Many employment statutes, including the NLRA and the Fair Labor Standards Act, exempt
managers or other supervisory employees from their protections. See. e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), (11)
(2000) (NLRA's exemption for supervisors); 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2000) (FLSA's exemption for salaried
executive, administrative, and professional employees).
38. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Stewart J. Schwab,
Life-Cycle Justice:Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993).
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to union protection and who is a "supervisor" not entitled to protection. 39
The Supreme Court has had a bit of a feud lately with the NLRB over the
supervisory status of nurses. In two different cases, the Court insisted that
nurses in nursing homes or other residential treatment facilities are supervisors while the Board continued to believe, that they are not. 40 In the Court's
view, of the organization chart of a nursing home staff, whoever is at the
top of the chart is necessarily a supervisor. The nurses at issue in Kentucky
River were labeled "building supervisors" on weekends, but received no
extra compensation and did not have keys to the building. 4 1 Their only
additional responsibility was in contacting other employees if a shift was
not fully staffed according to a ratio established by the employer. 42 They
had no authority to compel an employee to stay on duty or to come to
work, but they did occasionally request other employees to perform routine
tasks. 43 In the Court's view, a nurse with low pay, little bargaining power,
and lousy working conditions is not deemed an "employee" simply because
she is the top person in a very flat hierarchy. (In fact, the nurses at Kentucky River had no subordinates at all.) A higher-paid nurse working in a
major hospital who has better working conditions and enjoys more bargaining power, discretion about how to do her job, and respect from her colleagues (and, thus, has arguably less need of a union) would be an
"employee" simply because in her workplace there would be so many doc44
tors and hospital administrators above her on the ladder or pyramid.

39. § 152(3) of the NLRA excludes "supervisors" from the category of "employees" who are

protected by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). § 152(11) of the Act defines "supervisor" as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly
to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id.§ 152(11)40. The question in the nurse supervisor cases was whether nurses in nursing homes are supervisors because they "exercise independent judgment" in "responsibly directing" other employees in
caring for patients. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (Supreme Court rejected
NLRB's determination that nurses working in a psychiatric facility are not supervisors because in
Court's view a nurse exercises independent judgment in directing other employees even though the
independent judgment is largely constrained by professional or technical training); NLRB v. Health
Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (Supreme Court rejected NLRB's determination that
nurses are not supervisors because their independent judgment was exercised in the interest of the
employer, even though it was largely exercised incidental toprofessional or technical judgment about
the needs of patients).
41. Ky. River, 532 U.S. at723 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The notion that nurses in hospitals are employees but nurses in nursing homes arenot, even
though they may perform similar tasks under similar or worse conditions, was indeed the basis for a
Ninth Circuit decision rejecting the Board's determination that several nurses were employees rather
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The Supreme Court seemed to think that the problem of inadequate

coverage of the statute under its reading could be solved by drawing a distinction between professional employees who direct the performance of
"tasks" and supervisors who direct the performance of "people.

'4 5

But

because tasks are performed by people, the difference seems a bit difficult
to apply in practice. Little wonder then that the Board, which after all,
knows a bit more about working conditions for nurses than does the Court,
46
has not embraced the Court's suggested reading of the statute.
The work done by the ladder metaphor today is huge, especially as
firms take advantage of improved communications and a variety of electronic forms of monitoring and directing performance to "flatten hierarchies" in pursuit of cost savings. Suddenly as hierarchies flatten, there may
be few employees left-everyone down to the lowly cashier at McDonald's

or the customer service representative will be a supervisor in law, just as
they now have inflated titles.
Scholars of corporate law got a jump on labor and employment scholars several years ago when they asserted that the metaphor of a corporation
as a "person" or even a single integrated entity was fundamentally wrong,
47
and that in fact the corporation was just a network or nexus of contracts.
The new insight now is that the network of contracts is not confined to the
contracts between those people and physical or financial assets somehow

inside the finn (employees, managers, shareholders, plant and equipment,

than independent contractors. Evergreen New Hope Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. NLRB, Nos. 02-71544, 0271748, 2003 WL 21259895, at *2 (9th Cit. May 27, 2003) The court wrote:
That case involved nurses in a hospital where physicians are ordinarily present, while this one
involves a nursing home ordinarily visited by physicians once a month. In that case, we found
that the charge nurses were merely "one of the gang" with the other registered nurses on their
shift, and that they were "only in charge when the supervisory nurse is absent." In the case at
bar, there is no one of higher authority than the charge nurses at the facility during two out of
the three shifts of each day.
Id. (citation and alterations omitted).
45. Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 720 ("Perhaps the Board could offer a limiting interpretation of the
supervisory function of responsible direction by distinguishing between employees who direct the
manner of others' performance of discrete tasks from employees who direct other employees.").
46. Rather, the Board seems to be emphasizing that nursing home nurses exercise no independent
judgment in directing the work of other employees. See, e.g., Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v.
NLRB, 317 F.3d 316, 323-24 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding the Board's determination that nurses are
employees emphasizing the routine nature of nurse's responsibility to direct other employees); Beverly
Enters. Minn., Inc. v. NLRB, 266 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the Board's determination
that nurses are employees because court believes that the "routine or clerical" standard is inconsistent
with Kentucky River).
47. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a
Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822-23 (1999); G. Mitu
Gulati etal., Connected Contracts,47 UCLA L. REv. 887 (2000).
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accounts receivable, and debt). Rather, the corporation is the sum of its
contracts both inside and outside the boundaries of the firm.
Yet this insight has failed to penetrate the way that the NLRA defines
a secondary boycott, which still rests on the old image of a workplace being owned and controlled by the company that employs the worker.4 8
When janitors protest working conditions by picketing the building where
they work, rather than at the office of the company that is their nominal
employer, they may be forgiven for not understanding that in protesting
their working conditions they are, in the eyes of the law, targeting "neutral"
entities-the building owner and tenants. 49 The metaphor of the ladder
encourages us to focus only on the rung on which the particular employee
is standing, rather than to see what the ladder is leaning against and all the
other employees with whom the employee works who might be standing on
ladders nearby. If instead we saw all those employees as being in a vast
web supported from many different points, we might have a much more
accurate sense of where the power is and what kinds of legal regulation are
necessary to protect all the workers on the web.
The ladder metaphor, with its implicit narrative of a factory hierarchy
with exploitation and subordination on the lower rungs, has its uses, however. It has now been embraced by advocates of white collar unions and
labor sociologists who are alarmed at the declining autonomy of professional workers. Doctors seek to unionize, in this narrative, because they
feel entirely subservient to the insurance companies who effectively dictate
their compensaion, their professional judgment, and virtually every aspect
of their patient relationships. Rather than invoke the Norman Rockwell
image of a genial bespectacled family doctor in solo practice, doctors' unions portray physicians as harried paper pushers who no longer control the
pace of their work, the nature of their diagnoses, the course of patient
treatment, or the fees that they charge. The metaphor is easiest to translate
into law when the doctors are the legal employees of HMOs. But physicians unions are narrative entrepreneurs in attempting to cast insurance
companies (so-called third party payers) in the role of factory employer.
The move to organize medical residents and interns invoked similar
narratives of doctors grinding away during brutal hours of hard work in a
massive Taylorized factory-type teaching hospital. The new narrative about
medical residents and interns persuaded the NLRB when it became appar48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000).
49. CHRISTOPHER L. ERICKSON ET AL., UNIONS AND Low-WAGE IMMIGRANT WORKERS: LESSONS FROM THE JUSTICE FOR JANITORS CAMPAIGN TNLOS ANGELES, 1990-2002 (Ctr. Study L. & Soc'y
Jurisprudence
&
Soc.
Pol'y
Prog.,
Paper
No.
2,
2002),
available
at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/lss/2.
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ent that young doctors do so much of the crucial hard work of a hospital.
The Board deemed these young doctors employees because it was convinced that they were not, as the hospitals would have it, being mentored,
50
taught, and nurtured in the way that the label of "student" suggests.
The new narrative of professional worker as little more than a highstatus drone has been deployed by labor sociologists as well as union organizers; both are concerned about the use of technology to decrease latitude for exercising professional judgment. 5 1 A Harvard sociologist recently
studied airline pilots and symphony orchestra musicians. 52 As for pilots,
the research noted that the growth of automated equipment governing all
the technical aspects of flying and the increase in federally mandated safety
devices such as warning signals, guards on switches, or procedures that
must be followed, have reduced the discretion of pilots in compared to
years past. 53 One pilot used a distinctly drclass6 metaphor to describe the
routinization of his work: "I'm just a bus driver here. They own the bus,
they tell me where they want it driven, and I do it. So long as the bus
doesn't break, we don't have any problems. ' 54 According to the sociologist, airline pilots are only a hair's breadth above flight attendants in meas55
ures of satisfaction with opportunities for professional growth.
A number of scholars have suggested a new metaphor to replace the
ladder. Elite professional employment, they say, should be viewed not as a
ladder but as a tournament. 56 Although scholarship in this vein has been
limited mainly to law firms, the tournament metaphor would work quite
well to describe any "up or out" employment practice, whether it is in accounting, management consulting, investment banking, academia, or even
software design. Although the tournament metaphor was not adopted for
this purpose, it does have the connotation that all entrants have an equal

50. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 154, 165 (1999) (finding house staff are "employees" rather than "students" within the meaning of the NLRA because they spend 80% of their time

engaged in direct patient care and bear a close resemblance to apprentices in traditional skilled craft
occupations). College faculty are sometimes managerial and sometimes not, depending mainly upon the
characterization of the importance of faculty committees. Little seems to distinguish the cases except
the polities of the D.C. Circuit and the NLRB. See LeMoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55

(D.C. Cir. 2004).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

J. Richard Hackman, What is Happeningto ProfessionalWork?, 2 PERSP. ON WORK 4 (1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

56.

MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF

THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991). The literature on tournament internal labor markets is cited in David B.
Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Controlin the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms,84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1581 n.1 (1998).

CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol 80:839

chance of winning. Anyone can be the "Cinderella" team that makes it to
the final round of the tournament.
But the tournament metaphor, and especially its connotation of equality of opportunity, obscures the reality. As David Wilkins and Mitu Gulati
have argued, if we are going to adopt this tournament metaphor, we should
remember that tournaments have all sorts of devices built in to ensure that
not every entrant does have an equal chance. 57 Some entrants-the
"seeded" players-have advantages going in. This explains why the ranks
of elite law firm partners remain overwhelmingly white and male.
With or without the reminder that seeded players have advantages
built in, the tournament metaphor helps us see the substantial inequality
that results when the law fails to attend to the small things that make a huge
difference in whether certain workers have a chance to advance. If one
associate at a law, accounting, investment banking, or management consulting firm is excluded from what seems on the surface to be a small opportunity to gain experience or knowledge, current Title VII law is likely to
deem it nonactionable because it is not an "adverse employment action"
unless it is accompanied by a pay cut.58 But Wilkins and Gulati's work
shows how, especially in the realm of elite knowledge work, it is the nominally small opportunities that matter in determining which employees have
the chance to compete in later rounds.
Once upon a time we understood the way that small differences had
big effects because the narrative about discrimination told a different story.
Segregated drinking fountains, bathrooms, and buses were considered
unlawful even though on the face of it the differences between the "white"
and "colored" facilities were not always large (although sometimes they
were). But now we have a different narrative of employment, and depriving
someone of small things-this training session, that assignment-seems
trivial if there is no change in pay or benefits. We need to go back to the
metaphor of segregated drinking fountains to capture the nature and consequences of the small differences in treatment that make huge differences in
outcomes when subjective assessments of intangible factors determine
success or failure in elite knowledge work.
C.

Metaphors About the Nature of Knowledge

Let us now turn from metaphors about firms and about employment to
metaphors about knowledge. The crucial rhetorical move here was to con57, Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 56, at 1586-87.
58. Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination,47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998).
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ceptualize knowledge as property. Once you see knowledge and information in terms of real estate, with the well-established ideas of the right to
put up fences, evict trespassers, and use the land in whatever way you
want, it seems quite logical to insist that the right of intellectual property is
the right to control what humans do with what we know. As applied to
employee knowledge, corporate intellectual property becomes the right to
exploit your employees' creations and to prevent them from going to work
for competitors whenever the employer thinks that they may know too
much.
For generations, employers have sought legal remedies against employees' use of talent, training, or trade secrets for the benefit of their competitors. For quite some time the issue was considered a branch of the law
of unfair competition or, occasionally, the law of master and servant. Today the issue is regarded as fitting in the domain of intellectual property,
and the question is whether the firm's property rights in certain "proprietary information" (the scope of which is seldom defined) entitles it to restrict the freedom of another to work. There is a state-by-state fight over
whether courts will adopt the so-called "inevitable disclosure" doctrine,
which entitles employers to enjoin former employees from taking any job
that will require them to use or disclose knowledge that the employer
deems proprietary. 59 The seminal case, although one that has not found a
widespread following, is PepsiCo Inc. v. Redmond, in which the Seventh
Circuit upheld an injunction against a marketing employee going to work
for a competing soft drink firm on the ground that he knew too much about
his former employer's marketing strategy and inevitably would bring that
knowledge to bear in his next employment. 60 Once skill or know-how is
regarded as "proprietary" or as company "intellectual property," it seems
logical to enjoin any conduct that would run a serious risk of harming it,
even if the injunction is not to work.
The real estate metaphor is not new. Even the opponents of broad employer intellectual property rights have adopted it. Defenders of a robust
public domain today invoke the antiquarian image of the enclosure of the

59. See, e.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 291-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(collecting cases and rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine in California); William Lynch Schaller,
Trade Secret Inevitable Disclosure: Substantive, Procedural & Practical Implications of an Evolving
Doctrine (Part 1), 86 J_ PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 336 (2004); Rebecca J. Berkun, Comment,
The Dangersof the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure in Pennsylvania, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 157
(2003); James J. Mulcahy & Joy M. Tassin, Note, Is PepsiCo the Choice of the Next Generation: The
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and Its Place in New York Jurisprudence, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J.
233 (2003).
60. 54F3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
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commons that changed medieval English villages forever. 6 1 In the earlytwentieth century, a judge concerned about the free labor implications of
excessive protection for trade secrets complained that the law would impose a "mortgage on the workman's brain." 62 Today, kids who download
movies or music for free enjoy the renegade status that once was associated
with squatters who occupied land as a form of public protest.
In sum, what lawyers do, when they turn employee know-how into
corporate "property," is, as French theorist Pierre Bourdieu said, to "'symbolically consecrate ...power relation[s] between groups and classes' by
recording them in a form which anchors them securely to other power relations, eliminating the practical utility of perceiving them as contingent or
contestable. ''6 3 I have shown how metaphors and narratives about corporations, about work, and about knowledge have shaped the modem world of
work, and have done so in ways that are neither inevitable, natural, nor, in
my opinion, always just. In Bourdieu's terms, the symbolic role of law's
metaphors has been "to prettify or obscure domination with the veil of enchanted relationships." 64 The relationship between people and their property in our society is certainly one of the most enchanted, evoking as it does
images of the sanctity of the home and the treasured heirlooms that lie
within. By transforming employee knowledge into corporate property, law
has consecrated a power relationship and has justified rights to control
employee mobility in significant ways.
II.

THE MAJOR CHANGES IN WORK AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE NEW
ECONOMY

Let me now turn from metaphors about firms, about work, and about
knowledge to a consideration of how all three are changing in today's
economy. Regardless of political differences, as I said at the beginning,
what makes the dominant legal metaphors and narratives troubling is not
just that they are concocted and at least sometimes unfair, but that they are
61. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001); James Boyle, Fencing Off Ideas: Enclosure & the Disappearanceof the
Public Domain, 131 DAEDALUS 13, 16 (2002), James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEx. L. REV. 863 (2004).
62. Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, 32 F. 697, 700 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887) ("A naked assignment or
agreement to assign, in gross, a man's future labors as an author or inventor,--in other words, a mortgage on a man's brain, to bind all its future products,--oes not address itself favorably to our consideration.").
63. As interpreted by Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L.
REv. 1149, 1163 (1997) (quoting BOURDIEU, supra note 5, at 188).
64. Id. at 1164 (quoting BOURDIEU, supranote 5, at 188).
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anachronistic. They are inadequate to help us understand the world of
knowledge work in the new economy. Here I briefly explain why, as I outline the principal changes that we seem to refer to when we speak of the
phenomenon of "knowledge work" in the "new economy."
A.

The New Economy

There are a lot of things that people mean when they refer to "the new
economy." But almost everyone gives a central place to the importance of
information. Virtually every observer from every possible perspective
agrees that changes in the economy of industrial and postindustrial nations
and the world as a whole have increased the importance of intellectual
capital. Our dependence on information and knowledge to do our work has
steadily increased, and more people than ever before make a living buying
and selling information as opposed to things. Compared to fifty years ago,
even those who still sell or manufacture things (as opposed to knowledge)
spend a greater proportion of dollars per unit of output on knowledge than
they do on raw materials or labor.
For example, it has been estimated that four out of the five dollars that
Levi Strauss spends to make and sell a pair of jeans is spent on information,
rather than denim, dye, cutting, or sewing. 65 Put another way, some of the
largest "manufacturers" of clothing are not, technically, "manufacturers"
any longer. Levi Strauss is a marketing, design, and trademark holding
importer. It appears that the corporation no longer directly employs people
who actually makes jeans. Likewise Nike. 66 These corporations are primarily holders of intellectual property (the name, the red tab, the swoosh).
They are creators of demand and purveyors of image. They don't make
clothes, they make images and desires; they don't work with fabric, they
work with ideas.
Neither Levi Strauss nor Nike makes a thing in the U.S. if you focus
only on the activities conducted within the boundaries of each corporation.
Yet, if you focus on the company as a whole, it designs, manufactures, and
65. THOMAS A. STEWART, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: THE NEW WEALTH OF ORGANIZATIONS 14
(1997).

66. If either Levi Strauss or Nike does continue to directly employ any garment makers, the
number of such employees is most likely quite small. See generally Ralph Blumenthal, As Levi's Work
Is Exported. Stress Stayvs Home, N.Y. TnMEs,Oct. 19, 2003, at 24 (noting that Levi Strauss & Co. is
closing US and Canadian factories and contracting out work to suppliers in 50 countries, which will
reduce the company's payroll from a peak of 37,000 employees in 1996 to 9,750 by 2004 and will leave
none of its jeans production in North America); John Tedesco, The Stories That Made the Year, SAN
ANTONIO ExPRESS NEWS, Dec. 28, 2003, at 3N ("Jeans maker Levi Strauss closed its last two U.S.
plants here in 2003 and 800 employees lost their jobs. The maker of classic American denim pants now
relies on foreign labor."); Brief for Petitioners, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575).
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sells an enormous quantity of clothes by coordinating and directing hundreds of subcontractors all over the globe. If you look beyond the place of
incorporation and the location of the headquarters building, to focus instead
on location of their manufacturing activity, neither Levi Strauss nor Nike is
really an "American" company any longer. Little remains in the United
States except the design and marketing employees and people to manage
the companies' fantastically valuable trademarks. Nor is there much of
either corporation anywhere else, as Nike took great pains to note when it
was sued for making false and misleading statements about the labor practices in its overseas sweatshops. 67 As far as Nike was concerned, it had
little control over, little information about, and certainly no responsibility
for the conditions under which independent companies spread all over the
world actually sewed athletic wear and shoes. 68 Of course, if one examines
it from the perspective of the network of companies that are part of Nike' s
operations, over which Nike exerts total control in the design, quality,
quantity, timing, and price of its brand of apparel and accessories, the Nike
company is a large, coordinated, and very American company.
Just as improved communications and globalization have transformed
American garment manufacturing, so too have improved communications
and information-processing technology changed other industries. For example, in financial services, innovations in communication and information
management have enabled companies to reduce middle management, leaving clerical or service personnel with greater authority to make decisions
because they have electronic means of accessing data necessary to apply
company policies and their work can be electronically supervised to ensure
compliance. 69 When you wish to question a charge on your credit card, the
customer service representative (who may be an independent contractor or
an employee of a call center in Nova Scotia or India) can resolve the billing
dispute because she has access to complete computerized records of customer accounts. She has more authority and less autonomy than the office
clerk of a bank fifty years ago. The adjustments she makes to your account
over the phone are recorded and can be monitored via her supervisor's
computer, or even by an entirely automated fraud prevention program.
Thus corporate hierarchies can be flattened and, indeed, customer service

67. The facts of Nike v. Kasky, with citations to the briefs and record, are discussed in Erwin
Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1154 (2004).

68. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 66.
69.

RISE OF THE KNOWLEDGE WORKER xviii (James W. Cortada ed., 1998).
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can be outsourced to the lowest-cost labor market, yet the company can
70
maintain tight control over its operations.
The two examples from manufacturing and banking that I have just
given suggest how the increased availability of information in the new
economy has profoundly changed both white collar and factory work.
Overall, it has been estimated that information has become the source of
about three-fourths of value added in manufacturing. 7 1As one observer put
it in a typically breathless phrase: "the twenty-first century economy is one
of ever-increasing information intensity.... Knowledge has become what
we buy, sell, and do. It is the most important factor of production....
Knowledge assets.., have become more important to companies than
financial and physical assets."' 72 These phenomena have profoundly altered
the relationship of corporations to the workers who produce the product or
the service that the corporations sell.
B.

Knowledge Work

The changes in the labor market have been even more dramatic, as is
suggested by the metaphor of workers as vendors of skills. One of the most
salient features of "the new economy" is the increased importance of employee knowledge, or, more accurately, the management of employee
knowledge, to the success of the firm. Business schools and management
theorists lately have become interested in managing employee knowledge
to an extent not seen since Frederick Winslow Taylor pioneered ways to
routinize craft knowledge in the early-twentieth century. 73 Scholars of innovation are equally obsessed with employee knowledge and with how
knowledge-sharing among networks of employees enables faster and better
innovation. Psychologists are interested in employee knowledge, as the
welter of studies of tacit learning and tacit knowledge suggest. 74 And, of
course, so are lawyers, as they seek new ways to expand intellectual prop70. Id.
STEWART, supra note 65, at 14.
72. THOMAS A- STEWART, THE WEALTH OF KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ORGANIZATION 5 (2001).
73. On knowledge management today, see, for example, id.; Roy Lubit, Tacit Knowledge and
Knowledge Management: The Keys to Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 29 ORGANIZATIONAL
DYNAMICS 164 (2001). On Frederick W. Taylor, see ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY:
71.

FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY (1997).
74.

See, e.g., ARTHUR S. REBER, IMPLICIT LEARNING AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY ON THE

COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS (1993); Mark Lehrer & Kazuhiro Asakawa, Managing Intersecting R&D
Social Communities: A Comparative Study of European 'Knowledge Incubators' in Japanese and
American Firms, 24 ORG. STUD. 771 (2003); Lubit, supra note 73, at 164; Frederick A. Starke et al.,
Coping with the Sudden Loss of an IndispensableEmployee: An Exploratory Case Study, 39 J. APPLIED
BEHAV. SC). 208 (2003).
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erty rights and legal protections for so-called "proprietary information."
The convergence of all this scholarly inquiry and change in business practice is the invention of a new category of knowledge work.
We all throw around the label "knowledge work" but there is a certain
incoherence, or at least vagueness, in the category. Depending on how you
define the category, almost everyone I know is a knowledge worker: doctors, lawyers, software engineers, financiers, screenwriters, speechwriters,
community organizers, policy wonks, and school teachers. Under a broad
definition of knowledge work, even my brother, a high school dropout tool
and die maker, who carries his tool box from job to job, is too. He works
with sophisticated computerized machinery, and he constantly needs to,
and does, upgrade his skills by learning on the job to keep up with the increasing technological sophistication of his work. My brother-in-law is an
electrician with only a high school degree, but his work involves implementing complicated plans for installing complex electrical and communications cables and networks. Maybe even my Salvadoran nanny is a
knowledge worker because her work is highly interpersonal and involves
teaching values and life skills to children. 75 Their livelihoods depend on
their ability to benefit from the economic value of their knowledge about
people, technology, and how to get their work done better.
Of course, one can usefully distinguish, for purposes of counting,
which employees are "primarily" knowledge workers, because their job is
to produce and manipulate knowledge or information rather than things or
services (writers, scholars) and those who are not (my brother, my brotherin-law, and my nanny). But for present purposes it does not matter whether
we talk only of knowledge workers or whether we talk of workers whose
jobs require significant human capital. The point is that the economic importance of knowledge to employees has increased just as it has to firms in
the new economy.
Yet commentators often assume that the economic value of knowledge
is, by itself, an argument for expanded legal protections for intellectual
property. It could just as easily, however, be an argument for reduced [P
75. The problem of defining knowledge work has changed little since Princeton economist Fritz
Machlup first studied the field in the 1950s. FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962). He identified the "knowledge-producing" occupations to
include those who create new knowledge (research scientists, scholars, and writers), those who apply
existing knowledge to new situations (doctors, lawyers), and those who communicate existing knowledge to others (teachers, aircraft controllers, and corporate managers). Machlup is often credited with
inventing the category, if not with popularizing the term "knowledge work." See James W. Cortada,
Where Did Knowledge Workers Come From?, in RISE OF THE KNOWLEDGE WORKER, supra note 69, at
14. Later works by economists on knowledge production include MICHAEL ROGERS RUBIN & MARY
TAYLOR HUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 1960-1980 (1986).
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protection. We need better legal understanding of knowledge to figure out
how to share the wealth equitably. Unions are one of the best institutions
we have in society today to create the framework of negotiation that will
share the wealth. The economic return to knowledge is not, contrary to
popular belief, a reason why some workers either do not want or do not
need unions. Indeed, the emerging importance of knowledge may be a reason that workers need unions now more than ever.
We do not all have the same vision of the good society, a fair law, or a
just distribution of wealth. But we will never be able to have a meaningful
discussion of those issues, or about how to implement the reforms on which
we might agree, if we cannot develop a shared understanding of the world
of work. Thus it is time that we become conscious of the metaphors and
narratives that we use and have a debate about which ones are best.
III. THE POLITICS OF METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE: NOTES ON THE
BETTER USE OF METAPHORS

Lots of what we think we know about work and about the new economy is based on metaphors and stories about the nature of firms, work, and
knowledge. Those metaphors are not natural, and they have significant
consequences for the conditions in which we work, and even for who is
rich and poor in our society. I will offer some ideas on the better use of
metaphors and narratives in labor and employment law and as a way of
getting us to attend to the social and distributional consequences of the
choices we make. There are four areas in which I would like to suggest
reconsideration of the dominant narratives and metaphors.
A.

Intellectual Propertyand Human Capital

As the value and economic importance of intellectual capital increases, we will see many more disputes about control. There is little
agreement even about how to draw the line between intellectual property
and human capital. For example, employers routinely label certain information "proprietary" and insist on contractual agreements not to disclose that
information. Yet it is unclear in many jurisdictions whether such an agreement would be enforced if the information covered does not meet the (admittedly vague) definition of a trade secret. 76 The contours of trade secret
76. See, e.g., Self-Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 467 (9th Cir.
1990) (reading two prior California cases, Tele-Count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 214 Cal.
Rptr. 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), and Fais v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Cal. Ct. App- 1979), as support
for the proposition that an employee breached his duty of confidence and committed the common law
tort of misappropriation for revealing to his new employer non-trade secret information acquired during
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law are very uncertain, and even more uncertain are the circumstances in
which employers can obtain various remedies for misappropriation. For
instance, most management theorists and organizational psychologists recognize the value and importance of "tacit knowledge," that is, knowledge
77
that one acquires by doing but that is not explicitly identified or taught.
Under what circumstances would protection of tacit knowledge justify
restrictions on employee mobility? No one is entirely sure. Analysis of the
problem will not be aided by labeling tacit knowledge as a form of "intellectual property." The label affixed at the beginning tends to dictate outcome with little analysis.
Moreover, the legal doctrines about ownership and control of invention and the portability of human capital rest on the old mass production
model of innovation. Given the research described above, including the
"synthetic" and "network" metaphors for the contemporary innovation
process, certain aspects of employment-related intellectual property law
should perhaps be reconsidered. Rather than pushing for an expansion of
trade secret law to include "proprietary" information, and expanded remedies, including the injunctions against competitive employment that are the
core of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, we should perhaps think of narrowing or at least reallocating intellectual property rights.
Katherine Van Wezel Stone has advocated that protections for trade
secrets and enforcement of restrictive covenants should be trimmed back to
match the borders of the new psychological contract in which employees
sacrifice employment security for "employability security. '78 As I have
argued elsewhere, I think her proposal makes a great deal of sense, although, as I explain more fully below, I would not use the conceptual structure of contract to accomplish that goal, because the employee protections
would be contracted around. I would prefer to see a public policy, tort con79
cept, or some form of immutable statutory rights granted.
Here I want to propose a new conceptual structure for addressing the
problem of human capital. I want to suggest that we regard employees and
his former employment); Arrowhead Fin. Group, Inc. v. Welty, No. E032190, 2002 WL 31661269, at
*7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov- 26, 2002); Courtesy Temp. Serv., Inc. v. Camacho, 272 Cal. Rptr. 352, 358 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990); Am. Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Loral
Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). See generally 4 CALIFORNIA
EMPLOYMENT LAW ch. 70 (M. Kirby Wilcox ed., 2004).
77. See sources cited supra note 74.
78. Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital
in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REv. 721 (2002); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA
L. REv. 519 (2001).
79. Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and the Ownership of
Human Capital,34 CONN.L. REV. 765 (2002).
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firms as "joint authors" of proprietary knowledge, human capital, or firm
intellectual property. Each would have an undivided, and, possibly, nontransferable right to use the knowledge that was created mutually.8 0 Every
employee would be entitled to claim some formn of credit and some use of
the knowledge, and unions and firms would jointly administer the credit
system just as they now administer the screen credit system that determines
whose name you see on the screen at the movies.
These new metaphors of "joint authorship" and a right to credit better
reflect what I surmise is going on anyway. I identify three bases for the
correctness of my surmise. First, the tremendous doctrinal uncertainty
about the scope of intellectual property and the enforceability of nondisclosure and noncompete agreements but the relative scarcity of reported appellate decisions suggests that most disputes are settling. One suspects that the
employer and employee compromise about rights to use or control certain
knowledge. Cash payments are made and informal licensing agreements
are reached. Alan Hyde's work on rapid job mobility and the diffusion of
knowledge in Silicon Valley suggests that such an informal informationsharing system can work quite well.8 '
Second, scholars of innovation have noted the significance of informal
know-how trading. It is, they say, an inexpensive and flexible form of
cross-licensing of technology and intellectual property. Sometimes it works
better than formal agreements to perform R&D cooperatively or to license
or sell proprietary technical knowledge because the transaction costs are
lower. The efficiency is higher inasmuch as the decision whether to trade is
made by individual, knowledgeable engineers rather than by higher-level
82
managers who are the ones authorized to enter into formal agreements.
The third piece of evidence that suggests that firms and employees are
already developing some informal versions of a credit system is the practice of awarding stock options based on performance. Although the management literature suggests that group project work and group problem
solving are more common and more important than ever before, individual
compensation agreements that include stock options are still used routinely.8 3 Thus, someone is figuring out how to allocate credit or blame
when a group project succeeds or fails, and is translating that conclusion
80. For inspiration, I am indebted to my Loyola colleague Jay Dougherty who suggested an
expansion of the joint authorship concept in motion picture creation. F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee
Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 225

(2001)
81. HYDE, supra note 36, at xvi-xix.
82. VON HIPPEL, supra note 27, at 89.
83. See sources cited supra note 27.
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into stock options. It would be better if the law explicitly acknowledged
this fact of modem management and sought to regulate the fairness of that
process.
Our understanding of these social and economic benefits of the free
exchange of information would be aided if we looked at employee mobility
as a story of cross-pollination or cross-licensing rather than as story of
stealing property. If we consider the new narrative of innovations through
networks among firms rather than along an R&D assembly line within
firms, if we debate whether or when to regard employees as joint authors of
proprietary knowledge, we are more likely to develop a law and policy of
intellectual property and human capital that reconciles the competing
values.
Rhetorically, the moral basis for the joint authorship idea already exists. Consider the recent campaign of motion picture studios to discourage
unauthorized duplication of DVDs. To make the case that piracy is bad, the
Motion Picture Association of America has run a series of short "public
service" films that show before the trailers in movie theaters. Each features
a worker who contributes to the making of a film (a set designer, a stuntman). The workers describe how they feel about their contributions to the
movie, how important their hard work and talent is to the success of the
movie, and how piracy in effect steals "their" property.
Consider the spot featuring the set painter, David Goldstein, filmed
talking about his work in front of a bunch of shelves holding paints and set
construction materials. Piracy, he says, is bad because it does not really
hurt the producers, or, he corrects himself, it "does affect the producers, but
it's miniscule to the way it affects me, the guy working on construction, the
lighting guy, the sound guy." There follows a montage of the great movies
he has worked on, with his voiceover saying he met his wife making The
Big Chill. Then he looks quite heartfelt and says, "I'm not a million dollar
employee.... I'm lucky if I can put together 12 months of work in a year.
All I want to do is do the best product I can." The honest labor of a guy in
work boots and a flannel shirt is the movie studio's best claim to own the
84
work he generates.
This strategy is as old as copyright. Nineteenth-century copyright expansionists did not use publishers (who, after all, owned most copyrights)
as their front men. They used authors because authors put a human face on
the benefits of broad intellectual property protection. Thus, Charles Dick84. You can view the spot by visiting www.respectcopyrights.org, a website evidently run by the
Motion Picture Association of America as part of its antipiracy campaign. See also Patrick Goldstein,
The Big Picture:Hollywood Deals With Piracy,A Wary Eye on CDs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at E 1.
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ens became one of the most famous public advocates for expanded copyright protection. Then, as now, the fight over intellectual property was intense, and property holders resorted to creative ways to shore up the
legitimacy of their legal rights and to quell resistance. In Bourdieu's terms,
property holders and lawyers have a strategic interest in conserving or enhancing their authority or "symbolic capital."'85 Intellectual property rights,
like other forms of social status, are always at risk and always negotiable.
David Goldstein's plainspoken appeal for the moral worth of his hard work
is one strategy to preserve the social status of corporate intellectual
property.
American law did not consecrate the employer as copyright owner until the early-twentieth century precisely because courts thought it neither
desirable as a matter of economics nor moral as a matter of creative ethics
to divest writers of ownership in their works. 86 When the 1909 Copyright
Act abandoned the regime of strong author ownership in favor of a regime
of strong employer ownership, 87 American copyright law failed to address
the hard questions about how to divvy up profits, credit, and the right to
control the future uses of a work when the creators work in a group as employees. If the best claim the movie industry can make against piracy is to
invoke the contributions of set painters, stuntmen, grips, make-up artists,
and animators, then perhaps it is time to think about how they deal with the
portability of human capital. In particular, why does Hollywood allow the
partial portability of human capital through the screen credit system, even
as the studios own the copyrights? The uncertainty and mobility of employment can be reconciled with strong corporate intellectual property
rights.
B.

Labor Unions and Labor Market Intermediaries

The screen credit system that operates as a form of portable human
capital came into being because the labor unions (or guilds, as Hollywood
unions are called to distance themselves from the blue-collar connotation of
the term union) fought for it and continue to fight to maintain it. The success of the guilds in negotiating for decent working conditions and human
85. For a lucid explanation of Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital, see DAVID SWARTZ,
CULTURE & POWER: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU 88-93 (1997). Symbolic capital, according
to Bourdieu, is "a form of power that is not perceived as power but as legitimate demands for recognition, deference, obedience, or the services of others." Id. at 90; see also BOURDIEU, supra note 5, at
171-83; PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 112 21 (Richard Nice trans., 1990).
86. See Fisk, supra note 7, at 1.
87. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b)
(2000)).
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capital portability in the high velocity labor market of Hollywood suggests
a future role for labor unions in white collar industries. It is time we think
about labor unions as labor market intermediaries rather than just as the
collective representative of blue collar workers. Labor unions in industries
other than entertainment could play an important role in negotiating and
administering the pay-for-performance compensation arrangements that are
so much in vogue today. They could ensure that when employees are compensated in stock options that the option agreements are fair and the employees are aware of the risks they assume. Unions could play a role in
making sure that individual contributions to group projects are accurately
credited and fairly compensated. All of these things are going on in workplaces already. The question is whether they are being handled efficiently
or fairly when they are the product of individual negotiations.
The other area where I see a major role for labor market intermediaries is in coming to a sensible approach to the problems of the globalization
of work. Unions have long experience in dealing with the movement of
jobs from high wage labor markets to low wage labor markets. There is a
body of law that attempts, in a very limited way, to address the role of the
employee representative in negotiating over the relocation of bargaining
unit work-what used to be called the runaway shop. 88 What we now face
in the contemporary debate over the "offshoring" of technology jobs is a
new manifestation of the old runaway shop problem. Whether it is computer programming moving to India or movie production moving to Toronto, the problems are the same. 89 And we know from experience that the
individual decisions of firms about relocating work may not collectively
result in social results that are most desirable, although we also know the
limits of the ability of legal regulation to stop the flow of capital and jobs to
low-wage markets.
Labor unions have been thinking about these issues for years. Once
we stop thinking of labor unions through the lens of blue collar workers
and start thinking about them as the only labor market intermediary that
truly reflects employee voice, we have the beginning of a new approach to
the offshoring and globalization issues.

88. See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 312-17, 1239-49 (Patrick Hardin & John E.
Higgins, Jr., eds., 4th ed. 2001).
89. Gail Frommer, Hoorayfor
Toronto? Hollywood, Collective Bargaining,and Extraterritorial Union Rules in an Era of Globalization,6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55 (2003).
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C.

The New Psychological Contract

A third area where I think the new economy requires that we reconsider the metaphors and narratives of work is in how we understand the role
and content of the employment agreement. Here I want to build on the
enormously fertile work of Katherine Stone in suggesting that many workplaces now are characterized by a new implicit contract, or a new psychological contract which, unlike in old workplaces, involves no guarantee of
job security. 90

As I have argued elsewhere, the danger of using the conceptual structure of contract to achieve better protections for employees (or employers,
if one thinks they are in a weak labor market position) is that we generally
allow people to contract around minimum protections. 91 This problem
seems especially acute regarding ownership of intellectual property and
human capital, where the use of extremely broad contracts is quite common. Even in those areas, such as works for hire, where the permissible
uses of contractual delineation of authorship are spelled out quite clearly in
the statute, parties with strong labor market positions find other contractual
avenues to protect their interests. 92 For example, when a party that hires an
independent contractor wants ownership of a copyright to a work not covered by the nine enumerated categories for which the statute allows contractual designation of employer ownership, the employer simply
negotiates for an assignment of the copyright rather than for employer authorship. 93 The result is only slightly different than employer ownership. In
other words, we cannot rely on contract notions to protect the party in a
weaker bargaining position because the stronger party will simply contract
around whatever default protections the law supplies.
I also think it crucial that we not overstate the nature or extent of the
much-vaunted new "flexibility" in employment arrangements. The "new
psychological contract," in which employment security is "exchanged" for
greater human capital development opportunities and full portability of
human capital is not an accurate description of all jobs, or even all "knowledge work." The experience of airline pilots, whose work has become ever
more routinized, suggests even highly skilled work is not necessarily characterized by tremendous opportunities to develop human capital. Needless
to say, much of the uneven job growth that the U.S. has witnessed in the
90.
91.
92.
93.

See sources cited supra note 78.
Fisk, supra note 79.
See Dougherty, supra note 80Id.
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last several years in the bottom three quartiles of the income scale may not
be characterized by increased human capital. It is true that the work entailed in these jobs may have'been made more "flexible," but it should not
necessarily follow that the employment may justly be made more flexible,
meaning more insecure. 94 One does not necessarily follow from the other,
and it is a mistake to imagine that one is a trade-off for the other, for it
suggests that employees are being compensated for the economic risk that
they are being asked to assume.
In addition, we need to reconsider the proper sphere of contract and
tort in employment law. If the law of trade secrets in a particular state
would not designate a customer list or a marketing strategy as a trade secret, we need to consider whether to allow the employer to contract for
control over it in the form of a nondisclosure agreement or restrictive
covenant.
D.

Employee Benefits or PrivateSocial Insurance

The fourth and final area in which I believe that the challenges of the
new economy require a new approach is in the area of health and retirement
insurance. They used to be called "fringe benefits," which connoted that
they are and should be an optional benefit like a free gym membership or
free coffee, and that they were unimportant-a fringe. In the 1980s, as both
the cost and the social importance of health and retirement coverage became more important, some people started calling it "private social insurance," to try to invoke a narrative that these are publicly subsidized big
dollar social welfare programs like Medicare and Social Security. They
represent a huge form of off-budget social welfare spending and are the
largest tax subsidy in the U.S. budget. They play an absolutely essential
role in our social fabric. The rise of the high-velocity labor market calls
into question like never before the wisdom of providing most social insurance (health, disability, and retirement benefits in particular) through privately administered, jointly employee- and employer-financed, and
employment-linked benefits plans. As a society, we are facing a tremendous mismatch between the old story of health and retirement insurance as
optional benefits and the new world in which we as a society rely on employers to provide most social insurance. In short, we are torn between the
narrative of health and retirement insurance as "fringe benefits" and the

94. CHRIs BENNER, WORK IN THE NEW ECONOMY: FLEXIBLE LABOR MARKETS IN SILICON

VALLEY 223 (2002).
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narrative of health and retirement costs as one of the largest social welfare
programs a society maintains.
Wal-Mart is as good an example as any. Wal-Mart in Bakersfield,
California, tries to be perceived as a humane employer. They do not provide any benefits-no health care, no pensions, no childcare, no disability
insurance, nothing. And they do not pay enough for many employees to
afford those things themselves. But they are not heartless. They give each
employee a list of the free social services that are available in the city and
county. 95 The free clinic, the emergency rooms that treat for free, publicly
subsidized child care, and hot lines for substance abuse. For all I know,
they will offer assistance in applying for food stamps or tell you which
churches run soup kitchens. That would be one thing if we lived in a society in which taxes were set at a level that funded health care and child care
for all. But of course in our society we expect employers to provide health
care, retirement benefits, and a wage sufficient to keep working people off
the dole.
Wal-Mart is rapidly becoming a metaphor for all that is right or wrong
(depending on your perspective) with job growth in the new economy.
Wal-Mart has itself become a metaphor. Cheap consumer goods in an accessible, convenient, well-lit facility. Rapidly rising corporate profits. New
jobs. But these come at the expense of already over-burdened social welfare agencies that are asked to absorb the social insurance roles that used to
be expected of large firms.
The problem exists for knowledge work at the high end of the income
scale, as well as for low-wage work. As Alan Hyde has shown, in Silicon
Valley, which had a huge increase in wealth in the 1990s, no institutions
developed to enable mobile employees to provide for retirement or health
insurance needs. 96 As Hyde put it, "[t]his is most significant, for if such
institutions failed to arise for America's wealthiest and most sophisticated
workers, in the metropolitan area with the greatest concentration of college
degrees, in the most booming years of the U.S. economy, we may be fairly
' 97
confident they will never arise anywhere else."
When employment is the only gateway to health, disability, and retirement insurance, it puts phenomenal pressure on the employment relationship. It becomes expensive to hire an employee and catastrophic to lose
a job. Not surprisingly, in the last ten years we have witnessed a huge
amount of legislation and litigation to tweak the system. For example, em95. Telephone interview with Bakersfield community activist Laura B. Dennison (Apr. 3, 2004).
96. HYDE, supra note 36, at 206.
97. Id.
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ployers who make benefits available only to spouses create incentives to
fight for same-sex marriage, or to regulate domestic partnership. And eventually that will be one of the areas in which the effect of the Defense of
Marriage Act will be litigated. 98 The devastating consequences of switch-

ing jobs when employer health plans could exclude preexisting conditions
necessitated the enactment of federal legislation regulating insurance-an
industry generally regulated only by the states-to prevent preexisting

condition exclusions from gumming up the works of the labor market. 99
Living wage campaigns at the state and local level are thwarted by the

prospect of ERISA preemption from addressing the lack of health care,
which is one of the principal problems of working poor. 100 Health benefits
are the number one cause of strikes and lockouts in the current economy,

ranging from the recent Southern California grocery workers' dispute to
janitors' strikes nationwide. 10 1
The reality is that we as a society cannot afford to have everyone be a
contingent worker unless we figure out how to provide health, disability,

and retirement insurance through something other than employment. The
only good thing about having had a concentration of the phenomenon in
Silicon Valley and among knowledge workers is that it will take a health or

retirement insurance crisis among the educated elite before legislators take
it seriously as a problem for all. It may be what it takes to get us to abandon
the old narrative in the face of the new reality of knowledge work in the
new economy.

98. See Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership
and Sexual OrientationDiscrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (1998).
99. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-91c (2000), also
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-300gg-2 (2000).
100. The reason is that ERISA preempts any state or local laws that require employers to provide
health benefits, and ERISA itself does not require an employer to provide them. See generallyCatherine
L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failureof
Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LFGis. 35 (1996) (on the scope of ERISA preemption of state law).
101. See Curtain Fallingon Labor Talks, But Actors Don't Exit, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at Al 3
(key issue in labor dispute between actors' union and producers is health benefits); Sarah Lin & Monte
Morin, Voters in Inglewood Turn Away Wal-Mart, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at Al ("The prospect of
the Wal-Mart expansion fueled the longest supermarket strike in Southern California history. Tens of
thousands of grocery workers, who earn an average of $13 an hour, walked picket lines last fall and
winter to protest reductions in health benefits that the supermarkets said were needed to compete with
Wal-Mart."); Kurt Streeter, MTA, Mechanics Work on Easier Issues, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003 at B4
(negotiations "failed to focus on the issue that caused the strike the mechanics' health benefits");
Interview with Letitia Salcedo, Organizer for the Service Employees International Union (Sept. 24,
2003) (regarding the causes of labor disputes between janitors and building services contractors and
commercial office building owners).
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CONCLUSION

I was my own disappointment. I really don't know what I was looking
for when I got back from the war, but it seemed as though all I could see
was a lot of bright young men in gray flannel suits rushing around New
York in a frantic parade to nowhere, They seemed to me to be pursuing
neither ideals nor happiness-they were pursuing a routine. For a long
while I thought I was on the side lines watching that parade, and it was
quite a shock
to glance down and see that I too was wearing a gray flan102
nel suit.

The metaphor for the corporate job of the 1950s was the man in the
gray flannel suit. He rode the train downtown every day from his small
home in a nearby suburb, worked regular hours in a tall office building, and
earned a decent though not extravagant salary. There was stability, a salary
that could support a middle class family, and decent working conditions,
but there was also boredom, meaninglessness, and inefficient hierarchy.
Almost as soon as the phenomenon of corporate work was recognized as a
phenomenon, there were both boosters and doubters.
The hopeful narrative of this first decade of the twenty-first century
begins by noting that the man in the gray flannel suit has retired to Florida.
His replacement is a creative independent contractor who telecommutes
two days a week and drives the other three (or five) to a "worksite" in a
suburban office park. All over Los Angeles, signs do not advertise "office
space" for lease; rather, the signs advertise "creative space." There are
organizations that maintain websites rating different regions on their "crea103
tivity" as a way of assessing their suitability for economic expansion.
Their mantras are statements like the one attributed to Carly Fiorina, thenCEO of Hewlett-Packard: "Keep your tax incentives and highway interchanges, we will go where the highly skilled people are." 104 The quiet despair of the man in the gray flannel suit has given way to the youthful
optimism of the new creative class.
These simple narratives are, of course, vast over-simplifications. They
may make good journalism or compelling short fiction, but they are no
basis on which we should design a legal system. In our rapidly changing
economy, our ability as lawyers to shape the world by reimagining it has
never been more important. The future of American labor and, indeed,
American society, may turn on our willingness to tell a story about work,
102.

SLOAN WILSON, THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT 300 (1955).

103. One such website rates various regions throughout the United States to determine which best
fosters the creativity that the site claims is crucial to regional economic growth. See
http://www.catalytix.bizreg.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
104. id.
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about economic growth, and about social justice that captures the imagination of judges and legislators. The explosion of new metaphors and stories
about work invites us to think critically and carefully about which metaphors to choose in adapting legal rules for the creative employee in the
office park. Let's give the story a happy ending.

